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Summary
For the past 22 years, Afghanistan has been embroiled in conflict.  Humanitarian
assistance  programs have been a key part of the overall multilateral effort to relieve
human suffering and assist refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs).  In the
post-September 11 environment, while actions are being taken to eliminate Taliban
and Al Qaeda forces and others supporting terrorism, the needs have only become
more urgent.
The case of Afghanistan may present a special category of crisis, in which the
United States and others play a significant role in the war on terrorism while
simultaneously providing humanitarian and reconstruction assistance to the innocent
civilians caught in the crossfire.  Moreover, the conditions in Afghanistan represent
a challenging mix of infrastructure destruction, ongoing security concerns, and
humanitarian needs requiring an immediate response.  So far, the international
community has recognized that large amounts of aid and resources will be required
in the reconstruction effort.  In addition, a long-term commitment will be necessary
to ensure a stable, democratic Afghanistan emerges and will not fall prey to the twin
evils of drugs and terrorism.
As the Afghan phase of the war is concluded, transitional and reconstruction
assistance will move ahead.  It  is anticipated that Congress will examine the early
progress of reconstruction efforts,  aid priorities, and the long-term role to be played
by the United States.  It will likely also look at the contributions by and
responsibilities of key allies partnering in the efforts within Afghanistan.  The current
operating environment reveals some of the key challenges that lie ahead for the
government and people of Afghanistan and for the international community, such as
security issues, population movements, food security, environment and infrastructure,
health, and education.  While the recent international donors conference indicated a
strong willingness on the part of the international community to assist in the
restoration of Afghanistan, it also revealed the cost could amount to more than $15
billion over the next decade.
The many moving parts of the war on terrorism coupled with the uncertainty of
developments within Afghanistan make long-term planning and exit strategies
impossible at this stage.  Still, of potential, immediate interest to Congress are
security concerns, support of the interim administration, oversight and coordination
of aid projects, and the plight of women and children.
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Afghanistan’s Path to Reconstruction: 
Obstacles, Challenges, and
Issues for Congress
Once hostilities end and the Afghan phase of the war on terrorism starts to wind
down, reconstruction efforts will begin in earnest.  International attention will likely
turn to Afghanistan’s short- and medium-term future, raising questions between the
United States and its allies about division of labor, burdensharing, and exit strategies.
It is anticipated that Congress will examine  reconstruction efforts underway, aid
priorities, long-term reconstruction proposals, and the implementation role to be
played by the United States.
The Situation Before September 11, 2001
Even before the current crisis, Afghanistan had suffered twenty-two years of
war,  which included a long Soviet occupation, followed by civil war, and, beginning
in 1996, harsh Taliban rule in most of the country.1  With a devastated infrastructure
and minimal government and social services, even basic health care and education
were almost nonexistent.  The Taliban leadership focused available resources largely
on maintaining internal security and seeking to eliminate the last pockets of ethnic
minority opposition in the North and Northeast.  During this internal conflict, the
Taliban placed restrictions on women working outside the home, further aggravating
levels of poverty.  These factors, in combination with a severe drought over the last
three years, produced enormous human suffering in Afghanistan.
As of September 10, 2001, according to UNHCR, nearly four million Afghans
(out of a total population of about 26 million) were refugees – two million in
Pakistan, one and a half million in Iran, and the rest in Russia, India, the Central
Asian Republics, Europe, and other places.  In addition, as of September 10th, nearly
one million other Afghans were internally displaced persons (IDPs) uprooted by
drought and conflict.2  At that time U.N. agencies were searching for ways to help
five million of the most vulnerable Afghans, i.e., those in critical need of food and
shelter.  For IDPs this meant providing assistance close to where they lived to help
them return to their own homes.
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3 A USAID/DART office was set up in Islamabad in late December 2001.
4 See Situation Reports made available by the USAID, Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and
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Afghanistan Statistics
! The average life expectancy is about 45 years.
! Afghanistan has the highest maternal mortality rate in the world
(1 woman in 12 dies during childbirth). 
! Over a quarter of children die before reaching age five.  
! Afghanistan has the lowest per person caloric intake in the
world, and the highest per capita number of amputees.  
! Half of the population is under the age of 18 and has never
known peace.
! Despite these negative factors, a high fertility rate has caused its
population growth rate to exceed 3%.  In fact, over two decades
of war and destruction, the Afghan population may have grown
by a net 10 million, from approximately 16 million (according
to a 1975 census) to the current estimate of 26 million.
United Nations (U.N.) agencies such as the  U.N. High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR), U.N. Development Program (UNDP), U.N. Children’s Fund
(UNICEF), World Food Program (WFP) and U.N. Mine Action Service (UNMAS),
as well as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and numerous
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) such as Oxfam and Save the Children have
provided relief  inside Afghanistan and in refugee camps in neighboring countries.
 The United States has been the largest provider of humanitarian assistance to the
people of Afghanistan through its contributions to the UNHCR, other agencies, and
NGOs.  From 1994 until just recently, the United States did not have a United States
Agency for International Development (USAID) mission in Afghanistan.3  U.S. aid
was provided mainly through U.N. agencies and NGOs.  Via the WFP, the United
States  provided more than 80% of all food shipments to Afghanistan during the last
fiscal year and more than 50% this year.4
The Situation After September 11, 2001
The humanitarian situation deteriorated even further following the September
11 terrorist attacks in the United States.  Fears of U.S. reprisals against the Taliban
triggered Afghan population flights from major cities both toward rural areas and the
country’s borders with Iran and Pakistan, despite the risk posed by land mines and
unexploded munitions.  Although some humanitarian efforts continued during the
CRS-3
5 Approximately 1,800 of the peacekeepers are UK personnel.  See Ministry of Defence,
United Kingdom: [http://www.mod.uk].  
6 It is expected that the follow-on peacekeeping force will be under Turkish command.
height of the anti-Taliban war,  most international relief staff also left, making the
provision of assistance more complicated.  Still, food relief efforts can be credited
with preventing a widely-feared famine over the winter.
The U.S.-led campaign in Afghanistan  against the Taliban and Al Qaeda,
“Operation Enduring Freedom,” began on October 7. Within two months, by early
December, many of the Taliban strongholds had collapsed.  An interim government
was formed on December 22, 2001 following a meeting in Bonn, Germany.  Led by
Hamid Karzai, the new Afghan Interim Administration (AIA) began a transition to
recovery and reconstruction.  
The Bonn Agreement also outlined a basic three-year framework for
establishing a functioning government and essential institutions in Afghanistan, along
with immediate security measures to be taken.  
Current Operating Environment
The humanitarian needs and support required for a recovery in Afghanistan must
be understood in the context of the continuing vast  numbers of refugees and IDPs,
the variations among the regions in which they are located, and the political and
security situation throughout the country.  The collapsed infrastructure, rugged
terrain, and extreme weather  are significant factors with regard to access, food aid
and logistics, and plans for reconstruction.  The current operating environment is
complex with a number of urgent challenges.  Included in the next section are  brief
references to some initiatives under way.
Security
The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), installed in Afghanistan in
December, includes 4,500 peacekeepers drawn from 19 countries.5  It is led by the
British (Operation Fingal) and only operates in Kabul and immediate surrounding
areas.6  Its mission is to assist the new AIA with the provision of security and
stability in Kabul, dispose of mines and unexploded ordinance, and eventually train
soldiers for an Afghan army.  The Kabul airport is open for military flights, and there
are plans to accommodate civilian flights as well.  Separate from ISAF, the total
number of U.S. military personnel on the ground is roughly 5,200 with a focus on
logistics, airlifts, and intelligence.  U.S. troops and personnel, along with the British
and other coalition troops, are continuing the war effort against Taliban and Al Qaeda
remnants with actions such as Operation Anaconda in March 2002, which focused
on areas in the east around the Shah-e-Kot valley, or the current British-led
engagement, Operation Condor, in southeast Afghanistan.  
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Armed factions are feuding in different parts of the country. The goals of these
warlords and other elements are to try to seize local power and territory and maintain
profits from drugs and smuggling.  IDPs caught in this situation, particularly
minorities, face dire choices.  If they decide to leave, they become vulnerable and
homeless; if they stay, they risk harassment and violence and the possibility of U.S.
bombing. Reports of human rights abuses, rape, assault, and theft come from camps
in different areas.  Aid workers are also often placed in untenable positions.  If they
leave, they fear the IDPs will not survive; if they stay, they are unlikely to be able to
prevent these atrocities.  There is great concern about the security of aid workers
delivering food and emergency care outside Kabul.  Similar reports of theft and
beatings have made drivers wary and highlighted the fragile environment under
which humanitarian assistance is operating.  Stolen food has been distributed to local
residents and military units.  
Clearly related to security are questions concerning  the effectiveness of the AIA
in administering the government, facilitating the implementation of  recovery
initiatives, and addressing broader concerns of security and terrorism throughout
Afghanistan.  The AIA faces threats to security from three potential directions.  First,
the country’s lack of resources have encouraged a thriving drug trade.  Before the
Taliban, Afghanistan’s major export was opium.  It produced 75% of the world
supply.  Under the Taliban, which enforced a ban on opium cultivation in 1999,
according to some estimates, opium poppy cultivation dropped from 3,000 tons to
200 tons.  However, these numbers are deceiving.  It is believed that drugs continued
to be a lucrative source of income both for the Taliban and their opponents because
large stockpiles built up under Taliban rule, which may well have been intended  for
the world market, were held back as supply exceeded demand and caused a
depression in price.  Indeed, this spring may see the largest poppy crop in recent
years.  Controlling the drug trade is a huge challenge in a country with few other
resources and the incentive of profits from heroin on the world market.  While the
Karzai-led interim government has ordered a ban on the production, use, and
trafficking of all drugs, the government has little or no power of enforcement.
Sources report a recent  increase in cultivation linked to lawlessness and banditry on
the one hand, and the great need among farmers for some form of livelihood on the
other.  Demonstrating the difficulties involved, on April 12 the AIA’s poppy
eradication program was suspended after outbreaks of violence and the deaths of
several government workers.
Second, former combatants can have a direct  impact on humanitarian assistance
and recovery efforts.  If local struggles for power prevent or delay refugee and IDP
returns, this will severely hamper any recovery efforts.  Third, Afghanistan’s
neighbors–Pakistan, Iran, and Uzbekistan–can also play key roles, depending on
whether or not they provide support to these local contenders for power.
Population Movements
Population movements continue in and out of and within Afghanistan.  It is
estimated that there are 3.7 million refugees, mostly in Iran and Pakistan.  The
approximate number of IDPs remaining to date is just under a million.  The total
number of people  requiring  relocation  assistance is therefore around 4.5 million.
In coordination with government initiatives, UNHCR has set up voluntary return
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7 Spontaneous returns include 180,000 refugees from Pakistan and 61,000 refugees from
Iran.
8   In some areas up to 80% are in need of food assistance.
programs for refugees.  These Tripartite Agreements on repatriation between
UNHCR, Afghanistan, and the governments of Pakistan and Iran, respectively,
outline the framework for the voluntary return of Afghan refugees.  UNHCR reports
that since March 1, more than 400,000 Afghan refugees have repatriated from
Pakistan, and since April 9, more than 26,500 refugees have returned from Iran,
where eight registration centers were established.7  Approximately 9,000 refugees
from Tajikistan and Turkmenistan have also been assisted in their return.  Another
135,000 IDPs have returned to their homes with the assistance of the International
Organization for Migration (IOM).  UNHCR reports that it has opened more than 14
repatriation centers in Afghanistan.
Earlier in the year, new waves of Afghan refugees caused some alarm.  While
tens of thousands returned home, still other refugees (approximately 60,000 since
January 1, 2002)  fled to Pakistan and an unknown number to Iran because of crime,
fighting, and lack of food.  With no sustainable livelihood, many of these refugees
are forced to seek assistance.
UNHCR expects to repatriate 800,000 refugees from Pakistan and Iran and
400,000 IDPs this year.  It  will probably take several years for returns to be
completed, security permitting.  Given the conditions in Afghanistan, the
organizations coordinating aid to Afghanistan and the international community may
be forced to rethink the timetable for repatriation of refugees and return of IDPs. 
Longer-term care in refugee camps and other measures may be required to allow for
recovery to take hold while providing life-saving measures in the form of food,
security, shelter, and basic medical care.
Food Security
Afghanistan has had three years of drought, although there have been periods
of  precipitation in different parts of the country.  A USAID-funded assessment
indicates that the drought can be expected to last another 12-18 months.  In the
meantime, recent heavy rains, causing mudslides and floods, have reduced access to
certain areas, caused housing problems at some shelters and camps, and increased
assistance and protection needs.  The weather, like the terrain, is varied and harsh and
creates “pockets of need” which are difficult to reach by relief agencies. 
Food insecurity is relatively less severe but likely to continue in southern
Afghanistan, whereas in the “hunger belt” in the north and north east, food shortages
and distribution problems are exacerbating already difficult conditions.8 This in turn
is worsening existing ethnic tensions between the Pashtuns and either Uzbeks or
Tajiks and encouraging further population movements to southern Afghanistan or
across the border to Pakistan.
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The U.S. strategy has been to move as much food as possible into villages where
people reside.  In order to avoid diversion and theft of commodities, most food has
been stored in bordering countries and moved into Afghanistan by various means,
including trucks, pack animals, and airdrops.  Free distribution and food-for-work
programs direct the efforts of able-bodied recipients into community development
projects.  Recently the WFP began rapid helicopter deliveries in highly inaccessible
areas.  Between October and the end of April, the WFP delivered 440,183 metric tons
of food.  NGOs report that they have delivered 350,319 metric tons to 6.6 million
people.  WFP plans to provide food assistance to 9  million Afghans until the harvest
in July.  This increase reflects growing needs expected to occur prior to the harvest,
expanded WFP programs, and larger numbers of refugee returns.
Environment and Infrastructure
Afghanistan’s environment has also been severely compromised by the war and
drought.  The drought will have direct bearing not only on the planting season,
livestock production, and agricultural recovery, but more short-term concerns as well.
An inadequate supply of water has an impact on basic human needs, such as health,
consumption, and shelter (building brick houses requires water).  Dried-up wells,
poor irrigation practices, and lack of overall water management systems are critical
factors as Afghanistan enters its fourth year of drought.  Water shortages are a huge
problem as there is not enough water for returnees.  Deforestation, lack of energy,
and poor infrastructure, including roads and bridges, are also significant factors that
present formidable obstacles to reconstruction.
Almost every basic humanitarian need has an environmental component that
will continue to be important for the foreseeable future and will require careful
planning in the transition to reconstruction.   For example, the restoration of electric
power either could involve rebuilding conventional, dirty diesel and oil power plants
or constructing distributed, clean micro turbines to provide electricity and heat, and
the development of wind and solar energy.  The provision of clean water could be
improved with the reconstruction of wells, development of efficient irrigation
systems, and monitoring of water quality.  Innovative sanitation and waste treatment
facilities could be designed to reduce risks to human health and ultimately
destruction to the environment.
Land Mines
Land mines remain a huge problem throughout Afghanistan.  Afghanistan is
believed to have one of the worst mine and unexploded ordnance problems in the
world, with 5-7 million still littered about the country.  The Land Mine Monitor
estimates that of 724 million square meters of contaminated land, over half, 344
million square meters is classified as high-priority land for agriculture.  With over
80% of the Afghan population relying on agriculture for its livelihood, this is a
substantial obstacle not only to refugee and IDP returns, but to the basic recovery and
reconstruction plans as well.
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Health Sector
The World Health Organization (WHO), regional health officials, health-related
UN agencies, and key NGOs are assisting the Afghan Ministry of Health and
discussing  ways to rebuild the almost non-existent public health services.  According
to USAID, Afghanistan’s public health facilities cover roughly 12% of what is
needed.  Issues to be covered range from the provision of quality health care,
increasing the supply of pharmaceuticals, to health care access for millions of
Afghans.  A meeting in March  outlined an agenda for reconstruction of the health
sector.  There have been recent reports of outbreaks of influenza and scurvy in
several parts of Afghanistan; security concerns have prevented access to some of the
areas in question.  The joint UNHCR/WHO campaign has immunized 1.5 million
children against measles since the beginning of January.  Tuberculosis is also
considered to be a growing problem.  Significant health impacts which are symptoms
of much larger problems include heroin addiction and landmine injuries.  On April
11, USAID announced a $5 million Quick Impact Project, the Afghanistan Health
Services Enhancement Project, to expand  basic health care and services.  On April
16, UNICEF launched a nation-wide polio vaccination campaign for children under
the age of five.
Education and Community Development
The education system, particularly for women and girls, requires a great deal of
assistance if schools are to function with even the most basic infrastructure and tools
in the upcoming school year. USAID has provided 4 million textbooks to school
children throughout Afghanistan.  Other projects are underway to rebuild schools.
An assessment is being conducted by USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI)
to design a strategy for building political stability, particularly through community-
based programming.  In addition, through the International Organization for
Migration (IOM) the Afghanistan Emergency Information Project provides a daily
humanitarian information bulletin for radio broadcast.  Up to 30,000 radios have been
distributed to vulnerable segments of the Afghan population.  An agreement with
Voice of America is expanding the project’s regional capacity and increasing its
special broadcasts on important information pertaining to the relief effort.
The International Response
U.S. Humanitarian Assistance
According to USAID, during FY2001 the U.S. government provided $184.3
million in humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan ranging from airlifts of tents and
blankets to assistance with polio eradication, from tons of wheat to crop substitution
assistance for poppy growers.  On October 4, 2001, President Bush announced that
the United States would provide $320 million for FY2002  in U.S. humanitarian
assistance to Afghans both inside and outside Afghanistan’s borders.  Multiple U.S.
agencies are providing some form of humanitarian assistance, including
USAID/Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), USAID/Food For Peace
(FFP), Democracy & Governance (USAID/DG), United States Department of
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Peace, and $14.2 million is from OTI.  In addition, $22.5 million has come from USDA
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11  The Asian Development Bank, the UNDP and the World Bank convened a Ministerial
Meeting to conduct a preliminary needs assessment for external funding required to assist
Afghanistan in its reconstruction efforts.
Agriculture (USDA), Department of State’s Bureau of Population, Refugees, and
Migration (State/PRM), Department of State’s Demining Program, the Department
of State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs
(State/INL), the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), and the
Department of Defense (DOD). 
U.S. humanitarian assistance covers a wide variety of aid, services, and projects.
Thus far, the United States has provided over $375 million in FY2002 Afghan
humanitarian assistance directly through government agencies or as a  result of grants
to international organizations and NGOs.9   Through the Afghan Interim Authority
Fund coordinated by UNDP, donor support is being provided directly to the
operations and activities of the AIA.  Humanitarian assistance from other countries
has also been forthcoming since October 2001.  While exact figures are difficult to
ascertain, both bilateral and multilateral donors have made contributions toward
immediate and transitional assistance programs.10
Transitional Assistance and Reconstruction
International Conference on Reconstruction.  UNDP and World Bank
officials estimate that the reconstruction of Afghanistan will require $1.7 billion in
the first year, $10 billion over 5 years, and $15 billion in the next decade. Others
argue these numbers may be low, and put the overall cost  at closer to $30 billion. 
The International Conference on Reconstruction Assistance to Afghanistan held
in Tokyo on January 21 and 22, 200211 gave the AIA a chance to demonstrate its
commitment to the next phase of Afghanistan’s recovery and the international donor
community an opportunity to come together and formally demonstrate support for
this initiative.  The sixty-one countries and twenty-one international organizations
represented pledged $1.8 billion for 2002.  The U.S. government alone pledged $297
million.  The cumulative total was $4.5 billion, with some states making pledges over
multiple years and commitments of different time frames.  Some countries offered
support in kind but with no monetary value.  See table below.
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Table 1.  Pledges from the Tokyo Reconstruction Conference
(U.S. $ - millions)
Country Pledge Time Frame
European Union 495 in the first year
India 100 line of credit
Iran 560 over the next 5 years
Japan 500 over the next 2.5 years
Pakistan 100 over 5 years
Saudi Arabia 220 over 3 years
South Korea 45 over the next 2.5 years
United Kingdom 86 in 2002
United States 297 over the next year
Source: The New York Times, January 22, 2002.
The U.S. contribution is just under 25%, about on par with the U.S. share of
funding in the United Nations and International Financial Institutions (IFIs).12  The
United States hopes that other nations will carry a greater portion of the costs for
reconstruction and peacekeeping since it has paid for most of the military campaign
against the Taliban and Al Qaeda.  By comparison, the EU pledged the euro
equivalent of $495 million for 2002, which comes to nearly 30% of the assessed need
and amount pledged at the conference.  Within this pledge the European Commission
recently approved an Initial Recovery Program for Afghanistan. 
U.S. Reconstruction Assistance. The U.S. pledge to assist the people of
Afghanistan in 2002 is broken down as follows:
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Table 2.  U.S. Programs to Assist the People of Afghanistan




12 Food security and health
assistance and education
International Disaster Assistance 72 Incentives for stability
Office of Transition Initiatives 6 Community development; 
quick impact projects
PL 480 - Title II (food) 77 Relief and recovery 
416 (b) 44.9 Food for relief and recovery
Population, Refugees, Migration 52.6 Migration/refugee assistance
Economic Support Funds 17.25 Development assistance
Other sectors 8 Counternarcotics
Other sectors 7 Humanitarian demining13
Total 296.75
Source: The U.S. Department of State, The White House, Office of the Press  Secretary, January 28,
2002
It is important to note that the U.S. allocation covers humanitarian needs (food
relief, refugee assistance) and transition-to-reconstruction initiatives (development
assistance, community programs, quick impact projects).  Assistance requirements
cover a wide range of tasks due to the extreme conditions and complexity of the
operating environment in Afghanistan.  These initiatives must be viewed along
parallel, but integrated, tracks rather than the more usual progression over time from
one stage to another. 
According to the State Department, there will also be a $50 million line of credit
to finance U.S. projects through the Overseas Private Investment Corporation.  The
Department of Labor will also make available $3 million to implement job programs.
In addition, the United States has freed up assets frozen when the Taliban
regime was in power and made them available to the AIA.  Through the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York the Central Bank of Afghanistan already has access to
$193 million worth of gold and $24.9 million in cash.  There is an additional $25
million in Afghan Central Bank Funds held in other accounts; $23 million held by
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the International Transport Association (for overflights of Afghanistan), and $1.3
million from Ariana Afghan Airlines.
The President has requested $250 million in emergency supplemental FY2002
appropriations for Afghanistan.  This supplemental assistance, if appropriated by
Congress, will be in addition to the $300 million in FY2002 funding already
announced and allocated from appropriated funds.
The FY2003 budget request includes approximately $140 million for
Afghanistan for items such as refugee repatriation, food aid, and demining.
U.S. Legislation.  In December 2001, H.R. 3427, to provide assistance for the
relief and reconstruction of Afghanistan, and for other purposes, was referred to the
House International Relations Committee.  A similar bill, S.1880, was introduced in
the Senate and referred to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.  The Afghanistan
Freedom Support Act of 2002 (H.R. 3994) would provide $1.05 billion of
reconstruction aid to Afghanistan over four years.  The bill focuses on creating a
stable environment for Afghanistan, addressing such issues as counternarcotics,
terrorism, and enforcement, the coordination of U.S. efforts, given its multiple-
agency involvement, and humanitarian and relief assistance.  The bill was introduced
on March 14 by House International Relations Committee Chairman Henry Hyde and
later co-sponsored with Ranking Member Tom Lantos, and Middle East
Subcommittee Chairman Benjamin Gilman and Ranking Democrat Gary Ackerman.
The Committee adopted three amendments and approved the bill by voice vote
following markup on March 20, 2002.  On April 25, it was reported (Amended) by
the Committee on International Relations (H.Rept. 107-420) and placed on the House
Calendar (No. 250).  On May 15, the Rules Committee resolution (H.Res. 419) was
agreed to in the House.
Issues for Congress
Security
If reconstruction is to be a success, most observers believe it must occur in a
secure environment without threat to the new government and initiatives on the
ground.  As U.S. troops make headway on finishing the Afghan phase of the war,
there are many questions about ensuring a secure environment for reconstruction.
Can peace occur without U.S. involvement in the peacekeeping effort?  How
involved will the U.S. troops be in assembling and training an Afghan army?  What
role should the United States play in drug enforcement and the war on terrorism
inside Afghanistan?
Many believe a peacekeeping force is essential and the United States must be
part of such a force.  So far, the Bush Administration maintains that it will not  take
part in a peacekeeping force in Afghanistan.  However, the U.N. has called for more
foreign troops to disarm various groups and control warlords.  The upsurge in
conflict in early March, and more recent operations in southeastern Afghanistan,
suggest the possibility that the U.S. decision may be reconsidered.  Under the current
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mandate, peacekeepers are in Kabul and have no impact outside the capital.  Some
argue that the ISAF is too small and too limited to be effective.  Amid discussion
about the type of peacekeeping force required  has been the question of how long
peacekeepers will be required to stay.
Part of the current security plan includes the set up of an Afghan National Army
(ANA) for border control and stability.  Under consideration is the size of the multi-
ethnic army, which armed forces would be involved in training, and how the ANA
would work with the international forces already in place.  As the first units are
expected to finish training in 18 months, the provision of security in the interim is
also under discussion.   A Training Task Force (made up of roughly 150 Special
Forces troops plus any troops contributed by allied nations) has begun training the
first 240 Afghan enlisted soldiers and officers with another 160 to follow shortly.
Apart from preparation for combat and border patrols, the Afghan forces would
eventually be instructed on a set of more complex issues – respect for human rights,
loyalty to government, and civilian-military affairs.14  Meanwhile, UNDP is setting
up a Police Trust Fund to begin making plans for a new national police force.
Finally, there are the twin evils of drugs and terrorism, inextricably linked, but
requiring different forms of intervention and enforcement.  Moreover, in addition to
cracking down on the problem itself, alternative forms of livelihood are critical, such
as crop substitution, community projects, and other programs to benefit those directly
involved in these activities. 
Interim Administration
Critical to Afghanistan’s recovery in the short term and stability in the long term
is the credibility and effective functioning of its government.  In June the interim
Afghan government is scheduled to face another transition.  King Zahir Shah opened
the loya jirga, which will choose a new government to run Afghanistan for the next
two years until a new constitution is drafted and elections are held.  The first phase
of the loya jirga process got underway on April 15 when several hundred tribal
leaders gathered to select district representatives.  Over the next few weeks each of
Afghanistan’s 381 districts will convene assemblies (shuras) to select district
representatives. What role will the United States play in helping to build
administrative capacity in the form of a national government and institutional
development?  What is the United States currently doing to help the Afghan
government function and prepare for its next phase?
Oversight and Coordination of Aid Projects
In order to keep the support of the international community, reconstruction
efforts need to demonstrate the effective use of funds and their distribution.  What
is the United States doing to make sure aid is being spent wisely?  What role is the
United States playing to facilitate international collaboration on oversight and
coordination of aid projects?  How is the United States coordinating its various
agencies participating in reconstruction efforts? 
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From coordination mechanisms to a system of accountability, future donations
depend on the way in which current funds are used and whether they reach those for
whom they are intended.  The work of the U.N. (in particular UNDP), other
international organizations, NGOs, and governments will be critical. The number of
international actors on the ground create some concerns about aid assistance and how
projects will be managed and coordinated. The United States has made a substantial
pledge to Afghanistan, but its role in the overall aid coordination effort is less clear.
Few rules exist about how the money is to be spent.  Moreover, the lack of
experience by the AIA coupled with its many competing priorities (not least of which
is that a financial infrastructure is not yet in place), mean that assistance and guidance
on monetary matters (including agreements with lenders and contributions by donors)
by the international community remain critical.
A number of U.S. agencies are involved in the relief and recovery effort in
Afghanistan.  A single coordinator of U.S. assistance has not been appointed to
spearhead the initiatives underway.  While systems have been put in place in the field
to better coordinate day-to-day activities under the U.S. Ambassador, there is no
single person coordinating U.S. policy from Washington, DC. 
Aid Priorities
So far, there is little development-type aid in the U.S. pledge, although some is
focused on quick impact programs, long-term agriculture, women and children, and
education.  Where should the United States concentrate its aid priorities and efforts?
With what level and mix of assistance?  What is the Bush Administration’s objective
and strategy?  Will Congress begin to earmark sectors and, if so, based upon what
priorities?
Women and Children
The Taliban treatment of women and restrictions it imposed not only severely
curtailed the work force, but reduced women’s basic rights, education, and access to
health. On December 12, 2001 Congress passed the Afghan Women and Children
Relief Act of 2001 (S. 1573, P.L. 107-81) to address some of these concerns.  How
much impact will this legislation have on reconstruction initiatives specifically
focused on women and children?  To what extent will their needs be a primary point
of focus in aid distribution and the recovery effort?  What are the barriers to the
implementation of women’s projects?
Collateral Damage
In recent months claims of erroneous bombing targets have raised the question
of victim compensation and U.S. responsibility and also highlighted the difficulty of
intelligence gathering and security problems on the ground.  Although statutes and
legislation exist to protect victims of war, these are typically worked out on a case-
by-case basis.  The issue is blurred by the recognition that the end result may not be
a matter of simple human error, but rather a complex combination of factors for
which it is more difficult to determine responsibility.  Collateral damage  includes
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civilian losses,  considered  to be a by-product of war, despite efforts to minimize
innocent civilian casualties.  Extensive press coverage and a series of claims of
mistaken targets have made this a point of concern in recent months.  Should
legislation be developed specifically for Afghan citizens who are victims of collateral
damage?
